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I. INTRODUCTION
The law governing personal jurisdiction in America is in disarray.1
Over the last fifty years the United States Supreme Court has attempted to
clarify the standards which establish where a civil action may be brought.
2
Unfortunately, instead of providing guidance, the Court has created con-
3 - -4
fusion by issuing split opinions and standards without explanation.
In In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation5 the Minnesota Supreme Court
followed the high court's lead and furthered the confusion for those liti-
1. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 1027, 1027 (1995) (explaining the current state of American juris-
dictional law).
2. See infra Section II. A. - C.
3. See infra Section II. C.
4. See infra Section II. A. - C.
5. 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996).
1
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6
gating in Minnesota. The court issued a conclusory opinion in an area
where guidance is badly needed and, and as a result, contradicted the
small amount of precedent upon which practitioners relied.
7
This case note will examine the long and confusing road that is
American personal jurisdiction law." It will also examine the confusion
created by the Minnesota Supreme Court's most recent decision on the.9
topic. Lastly, it will call out for guidance on what should be a simple
question: When can a civil action be brought in Minnesota?
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF TWO STREAM OF
COMMERCE THEORIES
A. Traditional Basis
The Supreme Court first examined personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer
v. Neff,'° where it laid out the doctrine of territoriality." The Court later
expanded this notion by creating fictions allowing the assertion ofjurisdic-
tion over defendants who were domiciled within the forum or consented
to jurisdiction either expressly1
3 or implicitly. 14
Problems arose in the application of these theories as a result of in-
dustrialization and the prominence of the corporate form, which could be
present in more than one jurisdiction at a time. In its first finding re-
garding jurisdiction over corporations, the Supreme Court held that a
state could not exercise jurisdiction over the corporation outside the state
6. See infra Sections III.B., IV.A.
7. See infra Section II.E.
8. See infra Section II.A.-C.
9. See infra Section III.B., IV.A.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court based its decision on the principles of
public law that: 1) each state has jurisdiction over the persons and property lo-
cated within its borders and 2)that each state cannot exert jurisdiction outside of
its territorial borders. See id. at 722.
11. See id. at 727(holding that absent express waiver, a defendant's presence
within the forum state was a prerequisite to a state's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant).
12. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (suggesting in dictum
that domicile coupled with service of process outside of the forum state would be
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant).
13. See Kane v. NewJersey, 242 U.S. 160, 169 (1916) (upholding the validity
of a New Jersey statute requiring all out of state motorists to appoint an agent,
within the state, to receive service of process before using the state's highways).
14. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (upholding the validity of a
Massachusetts statute which appointed an agent, authorized to receive service of
process, for all nonresident motorists whenever they used the state's highways).
15. See generally 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1066 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (discussing
the evolution of personal jurisdiction law as it applies to corporations).
[Vol. 24
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• . 16
of its incorporation. This strict rule was eventually relaxed, allowing per-
sonal jurisdiction to be asserted over corporations 
under the consent
and presence1s theories. 19
B. International Shoe and Its Progeny
20
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court adopted
an approach separate and apart from the fictions that had evolved in the
wake of Pennoyer. The International Shoe decision set forth a two-step
analysis: (1) is jurisdiction over the defendant within the scope of the
16. SeeBank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.(13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). The court
stated:
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law,
and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no
longer obligatory, the corporation [sic] can have no existence. It must
dwell in the place its creation, and cannot migrate to another sover-
eignty.
Id.
17. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (allowing a state to re-
quire the appointment of an agent to receive service of process as a condition of
doing business within the state); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, et al., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 404, 407 (1855) (allowing corporations to consent to jurisdiction by ap-
pointing an agent within the forum state).
18. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265
(1917) (citing St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226
(1913), where the court authorized service of process upon a foreign corporation
without consent based, in part, on an inference that the foreign corporation was
present in the state due to its activities in the state); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170
U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (discussing the evolving treatment of corporations as indi-
vidual persons and the treatment of corporations and their members as present in
their state of incorporation for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over them).
However, a deficiency in this theory existed since the contacts were measured at
the time the complaint was filed, allowing a corporation to avoid being haled into
court by putting an end to its contacts within the forum. See, e.g., Agra Chem. Dis-
nib. Co., Inc. v. Marion Lab., Inc., 523 F. Supp 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting
the split of authority and then applying the rule measuring defendant's contacts
at the time the complaint was served). The presence theory and the consent the-
ory were later combined into the "doing business test." See, e.g., Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d. 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that the controlling con-
sideration when determining under the "presence" analysis whether to subject a
foreign corporations to suit in the forum state is that "there must be some con-
tinuous dealings in the state of the forum; enough to demand a trial away from
[the corporation's] home").
19. See generally WRIGHT & MITLER, supra note 15, § 1066 (discussing the vari-
ous theories of personal jurisdiction over corporations and their evolution).
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. SeeJuenger, supra note 1, at 1030-31. However, the court failed to use
International Shoe to sever the ties Pennoyer forged between jurisdiction and due
process. Id.
3
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22state's long-arm statute; and, (2) if jurisdiction falls within the scope of
the long-arm statute, does the assertion of jurisdiction violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.23 Jurisdiction is constitutional under step two of this analysis if the
defendant has "minimum contacts"24 with the forum state and, assuming
there are minimum contacts, if the assertion ofjurisdiction will not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."2 5
22. States whose long-arm statutes extend to the limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment either expressly or by court interpretation include: ALA. R. CIv. P.
4.2.; ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (Michie 1996); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-
124 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104, 3114 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-
423 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.181, 48.193 (West Supp.
1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-91 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 634-35 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1997); IND.
R. TRIAL P. 4.4 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West 1950 &
Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1994 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
454.210 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3201, 13:3206
(West 1991 & Supp. 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (West 1980 &
Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 6-103 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.705, 600.715, 600.725, 600.735, 600.755 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. §§ 303.13, 543.19 (1996); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-3-57,
93-11-67 (1972 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.594, 506.500 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-536 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 14-065, 14-080 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-A:121, 510:4
(Michie 1997); N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:4-4:4-5; N.Y. P. L. R. 302 (McKinney 1990 &
Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.D. R. CIv. P.
4 (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); OR.
R. CIv. P. ANN. 4 (Butterworth 1995); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301, 5322 (West
1981 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §
15-7-2 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-201-202, -214
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§17.041-.042
(West 1997); TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 108 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §11.051 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-22 to -28
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913 (Equity 1973 & Michie
Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4.28.185, 26.26.080 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West
1994 & Supp. 1997) WYo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107 (Michie 1997). States which limit
the exercise ofjurisdiction with their long-arm statutes include: MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 25-20 Rule 4B (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Banks & Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1997); OHIO R.
Crv. P. 4.3 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (Michie 1997).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
24. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
25. See id. "[D]ue process requires only that... [the defendant] have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] ... such that the maintenance of the suit
[Vol. 24
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The Court failed, however, to adequately define "minimum contacts"
or "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."2 6 The Court
attempted to clarify these standards several times since its decision in In-27
ternational Shoe, but instead has only increased the confusion. In Hanson
v. Denkla, for example, the Court declared that before a forum may as-
sert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the defendant must have
purposefully availed itself to the protections of the forum state through
some affirmative act. 9 The Court failed, like it had in International Shoe, to
adequately define "purposefully avail." In another decision on the topic,
the Court held that any jurisdictional requirement must take into account
not only due process but also the relationship among the forum, defen-
30
dant, and the litigation.30
This succession of opinions has left practitioners and courts with an
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" (quoting
Justice Douglas in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also Domtar,
Inc., v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 583 (1995) (applying the "minimum contact" and "fair play and substantial
justice" criteria in Minnesota).
26. See generally WRiGHr & MILLER, supra note 15, § 1067 (analyzing the defi-
ciencies in the International Shoe opinion).
27. See id.
28. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
29. See id. at 253. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." Id.
at 253; see also Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907
(Minn. 1983) (applying the purposeful availment standard in Minnesota); see, e.g.,
Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Minn. 1978) (finding that defendant
purposely availed himself of the State by committing fraud).
30. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
31. In addition to the cases mentioned, the Supreme Court has made several
other attempts to clarify the area of personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Columbia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 410 (1984) (identifying the dif-
ference between general and specific jurisdiction); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
790 (1984) (rejecting the argument that First Amendment concerns should be
used in jurisdictional inquiries); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
773-74 (1984) (allowing a plaintiff to bring suit in New Hampshire because the
statute of limitations had not yet run even though plaintiff had no real connection
with the state); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie des Bauxite de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (seeming to eliminate the concept of federalism
from the personal jurisdiction calculus); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101
(1978) (holding that the mere act of putting one's child on a plane is not suffi-
cient to meet the minimum contacts criteria); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 n.24 (stating
that the minimum contacts analysis applies in cases involving quasi-in rem juris-
diction where plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject
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31amorphous body of law requiring further interpretation. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that courts interpreting these standards have followed
33
widely divergent paths and have adopted conflicting approaches.
C. The Stream of Commerce Approach
The Illinois Supreme Court originated the stream of commerce the-
ory in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.34 In Gray, the
court upheld personal jurisdiction over a component parts manufacturer
that had no direct contacts with Illinois, but whose product had surfaced
in Illinois after the defendant had placed its product into the stream of35
commerce. The court held that if a corporation can foresee its products
reaching the forum state through the stream of commerce it is not unjust
for the forum to hold the corporation amenable to jurisdiction. The
court reasoned that since the defendant has benefited from the protec-
tion of the forum state, even if oniy indirectly, it should have to answer for
the harm caused by its products. After Gray, the stream of commerce
theory gained widespread acceptance in this country.
It was not until almost twenty years later, however, that the Supreme
Court, once again trying to define the parameters of the Fourteenth39
Amendment, addressed the stream of commerce theory. The case was
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,40 in which the Court held that the
foreseeability of defendant's products reaching the forum state was not.... 41
itself enough to subject the defendant to jurisdiction. The Court stated
that a defendant must "purposely avail[ I] itself of the privileges of conduct-
ing activities within the forum state" so that it may reasonably anticipate
32. See generally, Sean K_ Hornbeck, Comment, Transnational Litigation & Per-
sonalJurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1389, 1405 (1996) (noting
that the tests applied by jurisdictions often change and evolve with each subse-
quent case).
33. See id.
34. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
35. See id. at 767.
36. See id. at 766.
37. See id. at 767 (emphasis supplied).
38. See Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1218-19 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ey-
erly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1969); Consolidated Lab.
Inc., v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1967); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. 1969); Winston Indus., Inc. v. District
Court, 560 P.2d 572, 574 (Okla. 1977).
39. See generally Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Com-
merce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 264-65 (1988)
(discussing the evolution of the stream of commerce theory after Gray).
40. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
41. See id. at 295-98. The Supreme Court seemed to endorse the stream of
commerce theory as announced in Gray, but went on to distinguish Gray based on
the facts of the case. See id.
[Vol. 24
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being haled into court in the forum state.42
The Court's announcement in World-Wide Volkswagen that mere fore-
seeability was not enough appears to restrict the Gray stream of commerce
approach. The World-Wide Volkswagen decision had little effect, however,
43on the application of the stream of commerce theory by lower courts.
Instead, courts simply emphasized the defendant's role in the distribution
system" and the significance of the defendant's expectation" 45 that their
products would reach the forum when applying the stream of commerce
theory.46
The Supreme Court further added to the confusion in Asahi Metal
Industry Company v. Superior Court.47 Rather than clarifying the area, a di-
vided Court could agree only on the result.48 The Court could not, how-
ever, agree when the placing of a product into the stream of commerce
constituted the type of "minimum contacts" necessary to make the asser-
tion of jurisdiction constitutional. 49 Writing for the plurality, 5° Justice
42. See id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
43. See Hornbeck, supra note 32, at 1405 (stating that the "lower courts inter-
preted [World-Wide Volkswagen's] language in a varied and confusing manner.");
see also R. Lawrence Dessem, Personal Jurisdiction after Asahi: The Other
(International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. 41, 51-57 (1987) (discussing the confu-
sion that World-Wide Volkswagen created within the federal court system). Deci-
sions in the majority of the federal circuits upheld an expansive exercise of the
stream of commerce theory. See id. However, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh cir-
cuits have adopted a significantly narrower interpretation of the stream of com-
merce theory. See id.
44. See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081,
1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 at
297-298 (1980), which held that due process would not permit Oklahoma to im-
pose jurisdiction over the local New York retailer of a defective automobile, or
over the New York automobile wholesale distributor who sold to the retailers in
New York); Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984) (distinguishing the defendants from those
in Worldwide Volkswagen in that the defendants in Nelson were at the start of the
market distribution system and could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in
any forum within that market where their product caused injury); Alabama Power
Co. v. VSL. Corp., 448 So.2d 327, 329 (Ala. 1984) (upholding Alabama's exercise
of jurisdiction over a Minnesota manufacturer of trusses based on the manufac-
turer's actual knowledge that its trusses would be used in Alabama).
45. See, e.g., Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d at 1125-26; Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616
F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980); Svendsen v. Questor Corp., 304 N.W.2d 428, 431
(Iowa 1981).
46. See generally, Murphy, supra note 39, at 270-271 (discussing the effect that
World-Wide Volkswagen had on lower courts).
47. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In Asahi the Court was faced with the question of
whether awareness that a product would reach the forum state was sufficient to
constitute "minimum contacts." Id. at 105.
48. See id. at 113 (1987).
49. See id. at 115. All the Court could apparently agree upon was that once
the California plaintiff had settled with the defendants, it would be unreasonable
1998]
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O'Connor found that merely placing a product into the stream of com-
merce was not enough unless coupled with some other act. In an at-
tempt to identify what may constitute just such an act, Justice O'Connor
stated: "for example, designing the product for the market... , advertis-
ing in the forum state, establishing channels for providing regular advice
to customers ... , or marketing the product through a distributor... in
the forum state._5 2 Justice O'Connor also reiterated that under World-Wide
Volkswagen, "a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or
will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act
of placing the product into the stream of commerce into an act purpose-
fully directed toward the forum State."Ss This has become known as the
stream of commerce plus approach.4
Justice Brennan's opinion, on the other hand, focused on the tradi-
tional stream of commerce theory as announced in Gray and dismissed the55
additional conduct requirement as unnecessary. Justice Brennan stated
that, "[als long as [the defendant] is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come
"16as a surprise.
In the aftermath of Asahi, courts and practitioners are left with two
57
competing approaches both of which have been followed by lower
courts,5 s including those in Minnesota.59 As a result, more confusion exists
and unfair to subject the Japanese defendant and the Taiwanese defendant to
personal jurisdiction in California. See id. at 113-15.
50. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell,
andJustice Scalia. See id. at 103.
51. See id. at 112. "Additional conduct of the defendant may include an in-
tent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state." Id. (plurality opinion of
Justice O'Conner) (adopting reasoning from the Eighth Circuit).
52. See id. at ll2.
53. Id.
54. See Timothy C. Lynch, Roman Candles and Bottle Rockets: The Eighth Circuit
Blows Up the "Stream of Commerce Plus" Analysis in Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Dis-
play Fireworks Inc., 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1371, 1372, 1419 n.12 (1996) (citing
Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 965 F.2d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1992)).
55. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Justice Brennan, concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (Justice White, Justice Marshall & Justice Blackmun
concurring in part).
56. Id.
57. It should also be noted that Justice Stevens advocated a third option to
the approaches advocated by Justices O'Connor and Brennan. See Id. at 121
(Justice Stevens concurring in part with the plurality opinion). Under Stevens'
approach, a reasonableness test would be used to measure the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum. See Id.
58. Identifying which jurisdictions have selected one Asahi view over another
is complicated by the fact that many courts have applied the various Asahi ap-
proaches in an inconsistent and piecemeal fashion. The following is a modest at-
tempt to catalog the approaches followed in various jurisdictions. The reader is,
of course, encouraged to take a closer look at the law followed in his or her juris-
[Vol. 24
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with regard to the stream of commerce approach than ever before. 60 The
standards are extraordinarily difficult to apply and there is no consensus
as to the appropriate test or what standard the Supreme Court will adopt
61
next.
D. The Eighth Circuit
When faced with a personal jurisdiction question, the Eighth Circuit
employs a five-part test to determine whether the requisite "minimum
diction. For cases following Justice O'Connor's standard see Terracom v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1995); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose
Co., 35 F.3d 939, 940-47 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1151 (1995); Tobin
v. Astra Pharm. Prods. Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 544 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
914 (1993); Falkirk Mining Co., v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 375-76
(8th Cir. 1990). For cases following Justice Brennan's standard see Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc., v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993); Irving v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass, Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 823 (1989); Giotis v. Appollo of the Ozarks, 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); Oswalt v. Scripto, 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Ren-
ner v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 33 F.3d 277 (3rd Cir. 1994); Forschner Group, Inc., v.
New Trends, Vrolixs J.-C, No.CIV.A.B-89-531, 1994 WL 708129, at *4 (D. Conn.
Aug. 10, 1994); DeMoss v. City Mkt. Inc., 762 F. Supp 913, 918 (D. Utah 1991);
Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D. Guam 1990); AG-Chem
Equip. Co. v. Avco Corp., 666 F. Supp 1010, 1012-17 (W.D. Mich. 1987), vacated,
701 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp 769,
776-77 (D. Kan 1987); Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F. Supp 753, 756 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
For cases following Justice Stevens' standard see D'Almeida v. Stork Brabant B.V.,
71 F.3d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1570 (1996); Benitez-Allende
v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1018 (1989). The opinion in Benitez-Allende was written by Justice Breyer
while he was sitting on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Benitez-Allende,
857 F.2d at 28.
59. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 583 (1995); see also Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d
829, 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 977 (1993) (suggesting that Justice O'Connor's minimum contacts plus
standard does not apply in Minnesota).
60. SeeJuenger, supra note 1, at 1027.
61. Since the decision in Asahi, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Tho-
mas, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer have all been appointed to the Court.
Four of these Justices replaced the supporters of the traditional stream of com-
merce theory as advocated by Justice Brennan in Asahi. Therefore, uncertainty
exists as to how the court would decide a stream of commerce case should one
arise today. At least one commentator has suggested that if the current Court
were to hear a stream of commerce case, the end result would be a split opinion.
See Lori Elizabeth Jones, Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.-The Pure Stream of
Commerce No Longer Flows Through The Fourth Circuit, 29 U. RIcH. L. REv. 421, 452-
65 (1995) (analyzing how the current Supreme CourtJustices have dealt with the
stream of commerce theory in the past).
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contacts" are present.6 2 In determining whether minimum contacts exist,
the Eighth Circuit examines:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the
quantity of the contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the
cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in
providin a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the
parties.
It is the first factor of this test-the nature and quality of the con-
tacts-which appears to be of critical importance in stream of commerce
cases. That is, under what circumstances does placing a product into the
stream of commerce produce contacts of the nature and quality sufficient
tojustifyjurisdiction under the Federal Constitution?
The Eighth Circuit has, in answering this question, rejected the Gray
stream of commerce approach, holding that something more is required
than just the expectation, on the part of the defendant, that the product
would reach the forum. 64 According to the Eighth Circuit, merely placing
a product in the stream of commerce, absent some intent to serve the fo-
65rum market, is not sufficient contact to justify personal jurisdiction.
62. See Land-o-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340
(8th Cir. 1983); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d
1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1977); Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 192 (8th
Cir. 1965).
63. Land-o-Nod, 708 F.2d at 1340 (citing Aaron Ferer & Sons, 564 F.2d at 1215;
Afianase, 343 F.2d at 195-97). The last two factors are of secondary importance
and not determinative. Id. (citing Aaron Ferer & Sons, 564 F.2d at 1210 n.5); see
also Rostad v. On Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-21 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1006 (1985) (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.
1965)).
64. See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1978). Hut-
son involved an Italian defendant whose only connection with the forum was plac-
ing its product in the stream of commerce. See id. at 834-35. While the defendant
had no direct connection with the forum, it appears that the defendant could
have foreseen its product reaching the forum state. See id. See also Falkirk Mining
Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990) (using Minnesota's
five part test and relying on the Asahi minimum contacts plus analysis to overrule
the district court); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d
526, 528 (8th Cir. 1991); Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 927 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 50 U.S. 908 (1992). It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit
has, to a large extent, been a leader in the development of the stream of com-
merce theory. See Murphy, supra note 39, at 260-73 (noting the Eighth Circuit's
.separate path"); see generally Lynch, supra note 54, at 1391-99 (discussing the evo-
lution of the approach used by the Eighth Circuit). In fact, it is an Eighth Circuit
opinion that appears to have been the basis for the stream of commerce plus ap-
proach announced in Asahi by Justice O'Connor. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1987) (plurality opinion of Justice
O'Connor) (discussing Humble v. Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.
1984) in support of the stream of commerce plus theory; also citing Hutson v.
Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978)).
65. See Hutson, 584 F.2d at 837. The facts of each case must be weighted to
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Thus, the Eighth Circuit requires that the defendant intend to serve the






The same five-part test has been adopted by Minnesota courts. The
mere use of the Eighth Circuit's test by Minnesota courts does not indi-
cate, however, that Minnesota has adopted the Eighth Circuit's restrictive
approach for determining the nature and the quality of the contacts in
stream of commerce cases. In fact, in the past Minnesota has followed a
much different approach while purporting to use the same five-factor
analysis.69
For example, prior to In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, the leading
stream of commerce case in Minnesota was Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc.71 In Ro-
stad, the plaintiff was injured when a baseball bat weight manufactured by
the defendant flew off of a bat and struck him. 7' Defendant, On-Deck, a
determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. Id. at
837(citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958)). It should be noted how-
ever, the court was deeply divided on the issue with one of the three dissenting
judges calling the majority decision "a giant leap backward in the law." Id. at
841 (Lay,J., dissenting).
66. See Humble, 727 F.2d at 710. In Humble the court upheld the district
court's finding that it could not assert personal jurisdiction over a Japanese com-
pany which placed its products into the stream of commerce with the knowledge
that the products would reach the forum state. See id. The court again empha-
sized that the defendant had not advertised, solicited or otherwise sought to serve
the forum market. See id.; see also Humble v. Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., 578 F. Supp.
530 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (district court decision). It should be noted, however, that
a recent decision would seem to indicate that the Eighth Circuit may be in the
process of taking a more liberal approach to personal jurisdiction. See Barone v.
Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994) (acknowledging that O'Connor's stream of commerce
plus theory is non-binding precedent since it failed to gain the support of a major-
ity ofJustices in Asahi).
67. See Rostad v. On-Deck Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985); Dent-Air, Inc., v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332
N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1983); Stanek v. A.P.I. Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, 832-33
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
977 (1992). As is the case in the Eighth Circuit, in Minnesota the first three fac-
tors carry more weight than that last two factors. See Rostad, at 719-20; see also Mar-
quette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978) (stating that the
first three factors are "primary factors" and should be given more weight).
68. See infra Section IE discussing Minnesota's approach to the stream of
commerce theory.
69. See id.
70. 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996).
71. 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
72. See id. at 718.
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New Jersey Corporation, had no offices or agents in Minnesota and was
not licensed to do business in the state.73 Despite the defendant's lack of
direct contacts with the Minnesota, the supreme court affirmed the court
74of appeals, finding thatjurisdiction over On-Deck was appropriate.
The court's holding rejected the defendant's contention that after
World-Wide Volkswagen "purposeful contacts" must be direct contacts.75
The court reasoned that any other result would "'doom all products liabil-
ity cases to dismissal from forums other than the place of manufacture or
initial sale."' 76 Instead, the Rostad court followed the traditional interpre-
tation of Gray and World-Wide Volkswagen in finding jurisdiction over On-
77
Deck. The court held that "[t] he forum State does not exceed its power
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a cor-
poration that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."7s
Because of On-Deck's extensive indirect contacts, the court concluded
that it must have expected its products to reach Minnesota.7 9 Thus, the
Rostad court did not use Justice O'Connor's stream of commerce plus
analysis which has become the benchmark of prior Eighth Circuit deci-
sions. Rather, the court followed an approach much like that proposed
73. See id.
74. See id. at 722.
75. See id. at 720. The court stated that the defendant's contention that to be
purposeful the contacts must be direct contacts "misconstrues World-Wide
Volkswagen, ignores the Supreme Court's express recognition of the theory, for-
gets scholarly comment on the subject, and fails to account for the plethora of
cases upholding jurisdiction under a stream-of-commerce theory." Id.
76. See id. (citing Stewart Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Per-
sonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REv. 429, 442-43 (1981)).
77. See id. at 721. Gray has been adopted, in part, in Minnesota for the pur-
poses of determining whether the quantity of the contacts, and the nature and
quality of the contacts are sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" criteria. See
id. at 722; see also Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1993)
(stating that the Rostad court adopted the Gray approach).
78. Rostad, 372 N.W.2d 720 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (emphasis added).
79. See id. On-Deck's indirect contacts included: the use of national distribu-
tors in selling the product, "extensive marketing" by the weights inventor, and ex-
tensive profits derived from the sale of the product in Minnesota. See id. at 718-
19.
80. This approach has been expressly rejected in Minnesota. See Stanek, 474
N.W.2d at 833-34.
According to four justices... 'something more' than the defendant's act
of placing the product in the stream of commerce is required to satisfy
due process. Five justices, however, refused to join in this part of the
opinion, explicated by Justice O'Connor. Thus, we conclude that the
stream-of-commerce theory advanced in Gray and followed in Rostad has
not been limited by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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by Justice Brennan in Asahi,8 as originally set forth in the Gray case.
As a result of Rostad, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has applied the
832
more liberal approach in recent decisions. For example, in Stanek v.
A.P.I., Inc., two Minnesota workers sued a Canadian manufacturer of as-
bestos, Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee (LAQ), for injuries suffered while
on the job at a Minnesota company, which had purchased LAQ asbestos
for its own place of business.84 The Minnesota Court of Appeals found
that Minnesota could exercise jurisdiction over LAQ even though LAQ
85did not advertise or maintain any form of business activity in Minnesota.
Practitioners should, however, be cautious in relying on Rostad and
subsequent court of appeals decisions such as Stanek in light of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's most recent stream of commerce decision in In re
86
Minnesota Asbestos Litigation. It appears that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has, based on its decision in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, recon-
sidered its position and has opted for a more restrictive approach s7 similar
to the approach endorsed by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.
III. THE INRE MINNESOTA ASBESTOS LITIGATIONDECISION
A. The Facts
The plaintiffs in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation consisted of 187
people who suffered from various diseases allegedly caused by exposure to
Id. (emphasis added).
81. See Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 720. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (applying similar standards which do not require
direct contacts but only the defendant's expectation that they may be haled into
court in the forum state).
82. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896
(Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd, 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996); Bergherr v. Sommer, 523
N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), appeal dismissed, (Minn.Jan. 25, 1995); National
City Bank v. Ceresota Mill Ltd. Partnership, 476 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991), affd, 488 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. July 31, 1992); Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474
N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 977 (1993).
83. Stanek 474 N.W.2d at 831.
84. See id.
85. See id; see also Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 33-34. In Domtar, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court upheld jurisdiction over a Canadian insurer that did not do business
in Minnesota, but did insure Domtar, a Canadian company which operated a tar
factory in Minnesota. See id. The court based its finding of minimum contacts on
the fact that the Canadian insurer had agreed to defend Domtar against liability.
See id.
86. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 1996).
87. See id. at 244, 247-48.
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products manufactured byJohns-Manville Corporation (Manville).8 8 One
product produced by Manville alleged to have caused the illnesses was• 89
Manville's Transite Pressure Pipe. Distributor Colonial Sugar Refining
Co., Ltd. (CRS) provided Manville with the asbestos needed to produce
the Transite Pressure Pipe.9o
CSR is a multinational Australian company with its principal place of
business in Sydney.91 CSR had never been licensed or registered to do92
business in Minnesota and had no other direct contacts with Minne-
sota.9 3 Although CSR never had any direct contacts with Minnesota, CSR94
did have several indirect contacts with the state. For instance, CSR made
multiple visits to Manville's factories with the intention of fostering the
companies' business relationship and to gather information which it used
in refining its product so that Manville would increase the use of CSR as-95
bestos. This effort proved successful, and as a result CSR asbestos was
distributed on a national scale through Manville's Transite Pressure
Pipe.96 CSR also advertised in international trade publications that were
distributed in the United States.
97
Over CSR's course of dealings with Manville, CSR developed an un-
derstanding of Manville's business. As a result of this understanding,
CSR had knowledge that Manville was one of the largest suppliers of build-
88. See id. at 244-45.
89. See id.
90. See id. CSR actually sold the asbestos through one of its subsidiaries, Aus-
tralian Blue Asbestos Pry. Ltd., which CSR wholly acquired in 1966. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 244. CSR was not licensed to do business anywhere in the
United States. See id.
93. See id. at 244-45. According to the court of appeals CSR never:
1. Maintained an office, telephone .... address, or bank account in Min-
nesota; 2. Employed anyone.., in Minnesota; 3. Owned, leased, or pos-
sessed any... assets in Minnesota.... ; 4. Had been a party to a contract
in Minnesota... ; 5. Engaged in any advertising directed to or otherwise
calculated to reach Minnesota; 6. Sold any products in or transported
any products to Minnesota... ; 7. Mined, manufactured, processed, ex-
ported, converted, compounded, retailed and/or required to be used
asbestos.., to or for anyone in Minnesota; 8. Designed, tested, evalu-
ated, packaged, furnished, supplied, or sold asbestos.., to or for anyone
in Minnesota; and 9. Marketed, distributed, or shipped raw asbestos to or
in Minnesota.
Id.
94. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995); see also Respondent's Brief at 5, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig. (No. C1-95-
223).
95. See id.
96. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d at 898.
97. See Respondent's Brief at 5, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig.(No.C1-95-
223).
98. See id. at 5-6.
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ing products in the United States and that when CSR's products were used
by Manville, those products would be distributed to a national market.09
In addition, CSR was aware of Manville's extensive connections with the
state of Minnesota.100
B. The Court's Analysis
The court in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation reversed the holding of
the court of appeals and reinstated the district court's order dismissing
the complaint against CSR.102 The court first determined that the Minne-
sota long-arm statute'03 allowed the assertion of personal jurisdiction "to
the extent that... [C]onstitutional requirements of due process will al-
low." 104 The court then examined the contacts that CSR had with Minne-
sota to determine if the requisite "minimum contacts" existed.'0 5 The
court claimed to examine: 1)the quantity of contacts with Minnesota,
2)the nature and quality of those contacts and 3)the source and connec-
tion of the cause of action with those contacts. The court then re-
jected107 the plaintiff's contention that CSR's relationship with Manville
was such that Manville's contacts with Minnesota should be imputed to
CSR. Rather, the court found that Manville's activities were nothing
more than the "'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with [the] nonresident defendant, '"1 and were insufficient to satisfy the110
"minimum contacts" requirement. Since CSR did not "purposely estab-
lish""' contacts with Minnesota the court concluded, without explanation,
99. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d at 898.
100. See id. The record indicates that CSR knew that Manville served a national
market that included Minnesota. See id.
101. See id. at 902 (holding that the district court could assert personal juris-
diction over CSR under a stream of commerce theory).
102. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 1996).
103. See MiNN. STAT. § 543.19, Subd. (1)(c) (1986). "[A] court of this state...
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation... [who]
[c] ommits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Min-
nesota...." Id.; see Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 29
(Minn.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 583 (1995) (interpreting § 543.19 to extend to the
limits of the federal due process requirements); see also S.B. Schmidt Paper v. A to
Z Paper Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
104. See Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 29; See also Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color
Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992).
105. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d at 246.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 246-47. "There is no... legal basis for such a contention." Id. at
247.
108. See id. at 247.
109. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
110. See id. at 246-47.
111. See id. at 247 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985)). The touchstone of due process requires that the defendant purposely
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that the plaintiffs could not establish sufficient "minimum contacts."
1 2
Lastly, the court examined whether the assertion of jurisdiction over
CSR would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' The court conceded that CSR could foresee that its products
would reach Minnesota. 114 However, the court stated that the foreseeabil-
ity that is important is the foreseeability of being haled into court in Min-
nesota. The court stated that "[ t] o show that kind of foreseeability, the
plaintiff must show that CSR intended to directly or indirectly market its
product in Minnesota or that CSR delivered its asbestos into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by customers in
Minnesota."' 6 The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to make such
a showing.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INRE MINNESOTA ASBESTOS LITIGATION
.. . 117
The court in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation was faced with a diffi-
cult decision in light of the widespread confusion that exists in the area of. .. . 118
personal jurisdiction. The court should have used the opportunity to
clarify the current state of the stream of commerce theory in Minnesota.
Instead, the court issued a conclusory opinion which is inconsistent with
prior Minnesota precedent and, as a result, adds to the already confused
state of the law."
establish minimum contacts in the forum state. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474
(1985).
112. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d at 247. The contacts were
not of 1)sufficient quantity, or 2)sufficient quality or nature, and 3)the connec-
tion of the contacts with the cause of action was insufficient. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996).
118. See supra Section II.
119. Compare In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d at 247 with Rostad v.
On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720-22 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006
(1985) (stating that neither defendant established direct contacts, because both
marketed their products on a national scale and both sold their products through
an intermediary which did significant amounts of business in Minnesota) and
Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, 832-35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied,
(Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1993) (finding minimum con-
tacts between a Canadian asbestos manufacturer and Minnesota based on the sale
of asbestos to Minnesota companies, even though the manufacturer never main-
tained an office, advertised, or engaged in continuous business in Minnesota).
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A. Minimum Contacts
In deciding whether minimum contacts were present, the In re Min-
120nesota Asbestos Litigation court relied on the Minnesota five-part test
which, of course, is the hallmark of Minnesota personal jurisdiction analy-•121
sis. While the court failed to expressly acknowledge as much, part two
of the test, which deals with the nature and quality of the contacts,
played the critical role in the court's decision. In holding that the nature
and quality of the contacts were not sufficient to allow Minnesota to con-
stitutionally assert jurisdiction over CSR, the In re Minnesota Asbestos Litiga-
tion court placed great emphasis on the fact that there were no direct con-
tacts between CSR and Minnesota.123  This conclusion is problematic
because it conflicts with prior Minnesota stream of commerce decisions
which suggest that only indirect contacts are required.
To begin with, Minnesota courts have traditionally followed the
stream of commerce theory as advanced in Gray and World-Wide Volkswagen
to determine whether a sufficient quality of contacts existed. In Rostad,
for example, the court determined that due process was not offended by
the exercising of jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products will be
125purchased by consumers in the forum state. Thus, Rostad appeared to
establish that indirect contacts alone are sufficient as long as the defen-126
dant purposefully established those contacts. In re Minnesota Asbestos
Litigation conflicts with this understanding of Rostad. Thus, the court
should have concluded under Rostad, that Manville's extensive contacts
with Minnesota should be imputed to CSR, and that such indirect contacts• . 127
were sufficient to make the assertion ofjurisdiction constitutional.
Similarly, the decision in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation seems to
120. In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, 552 N.W.2d at 246.
121. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
123. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d at 247.
124. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
125. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896, 899-901 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1985).
126. See Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 720-22, (rejecting the argument that contacts
must be direct contacts and stating "[the argument] ignores the Supreme Court's
express recognition of the theory, forgets scholarly comment on the subject, and
fails to account for the plethora of cases upholding jurisdiction under a stream-of-
commerce theory."); see also Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977
(1993) (suggesting that, because only four of the Justices in the Asahi decision
maintained that minimum contacts requires "something more" than a defendant
merely placing its product in the stream of commerce, the Supreme Court did
not therefore limit the stream of commerce theory advanced in the Gray and Ro-
stad decisions).
127. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d at 720.
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• 128
conflict with the court of appeals decision in Stanek v. A.P.I. In Stanek,
the court concluded that the "wide spread sale of asbestos" was sufficient
to meet the quality and nature criteria in Minnesota.'2 Considering that
In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation involved the distribution of asbestos too,
the hazardous nature of the product factor suggests that the quality and
nature of the contacts were sufficient to allow Minnesota to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over CSR. Thus, the In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation de-
cision has left in doubt the precedential value of Rostad and the cases that
followed Rostad.'30
Even assuming, however, that Minnesota follows the stream of com-
merce approach that requires something more than indirect contacts, the
In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation decision is still problematic. It is well-
settled that the nature and quality of the contacts are sufficient to justify
jurisdiction if the defendant has purposefully availed itself to the benefits
and protections of the forum state. Clearly CSR purposefully availed it-
self to the benefits and protections of Minnesota law and, therefore, had
the nature and the quality of contacts with Minnesota necessary to justify
personal jurisdiction. The record clearly shows that CSR made several at-
tempts to improve its asbestos for use by Manville and that it took actions
to create a national market for its product, i s2 a market that included Min-
128. 474 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 31,
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1993).
129. See id. at 834-35. "It is unknown which ... sales reached Minnesota ....
[n]evertheless, [the defendant's] extensive sales to large American distributors
suggest contacts sufficient in nature and quality so that a reasonable inference
may be drawn from the character of the business." Id. (citing Gray v. American Ra-
diator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)). Indeed, many courts,
including those in Minnesota, have considered the hazardous nature of the prod-
ucts when determining the nature and quality of the contacts. See Velandra v.
Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault 336 F.2d 292, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1964);
Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prod. Corp., 218 F. Supp 524, 528 (D. Minn. 1961);
Stanek, 474 N.W.2d at 835 (citing DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45
(Minn. 1982)). "[A] lesser volume of inherently dangerous products constitute [s]
a more significant contact with the state than would a larger volume of products
offering little or no hazard to the inhabitants of the state." Velandra, 336 F.2d at
297-98.
130. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
131. See Dent-Air, Inc., v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907
(Minn. 1983).
132. CSR visited the Manville plant every few years to find out what it could do
to its asbestos so that Manville would use it in their products. See Respondent's
Brief at 3-4, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., (No. C1-95-223). "Work done by
C.S.R. to prove that blue fiber [asbestos] was satisfactory [for its use in asbestos
cement products] helped materially to bring about [an increase in the fiber's
price] and augmented work by Johns-Manville." See In re Minnesota Asbestos
Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); see also Respondent's Brief at
5, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig. (No. C1-95-223).
[Vol. 24
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss1/1
IN RE MINNESOTA ASBESTOS LITIGATION
nesota.' The record also indicates that Manville essentially acted as a dis-
tributor for CSR asbestos.13 4 CSR repeatedly visited Manville's operations
over the course of their business dealings for the sole purpose of fostering
their relationship with the hope that Manville would increase its use of
CSR asbestos.' Additionally, CSR had full knowledge that Manville was
one of the largest producers of building materials in the county and dis-
tributed its products to every state in the nation. 3 6
In short, no matter which of the two stream of commerce approaches
is applied, CSR had the nature and quality of contacts necessary for Min-
nesota to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over CSR. None of the addi-
tional factors in the Minnesota five-factor test precludes this result.
Clearly the first factor, the quantity of the contacts, was satisfied given the
numerous contacts CSR had with Minnesota via Manville.' 7 The third,
and last major factor in the five-part analysis-the source of the con-
tacts'3s-also supports the assertion of jurisdiction over CSR. Like factor
two, this factor seemed to trouble the court. The court noted that the
source of CSR's contacts with Minnesota were though Manville, an inter-
mediary.139 However, the court failed to acknowledge that Minnesota
courts have previously found that when a company wants to establish a na-
tional market which includes Minnesota, the fact that the product only
reaches Minnesota through an intermediary is not enough to prevent the140
court from asserting jurisdiction. Therefore, this third factor also weighs
in favor ofjurisdiction over CSR.
Nor do the last two factors-the forum's interest in providing a fo-
rum and the convenience of the forum-weigh against the assertion of
jurisdiction over CSR. These last two factors-the interest of Minnesota in
providing forum and the convenience of parties-are generally less im-
portant and receive less consideration which was definitely the case in In re
Minnesota Asbestos Litigation where the court gave these last two factors only
a cursory treatment. Factor four clearly existed since Minnesota has a
strong interest in providing a forum for citizens injured by hazardous
133. See Respondent's Brief at 9, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., (No. C1-95-
223); See also Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985) (considering that On-Deck entered into contracts to
distribute its product throughout North America, including Minnesota).
134. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (concluding that Manville was acting as CSR's distributor).
135. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d at 898. The " [w]ork done
by C.S.R. to prove that blue fiber was satisfactory helped materially to bring about
[a price increase] and augmented work byJohns-Manville." Id.
136. See id. at 898-99.
137. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Sections II.D & II.E.
139. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Minn. 1996).
140. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
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products.14 1 With respect to factor five, 14 although litigation in Minnesota
would not be convenient and would place a great burden on CSR,14 3 this
last factor is greatly outweighed by those in favor ofjurisdiction.
In short, the Minnesota Supreme court, based on prior Minnesota
case law and United States Supreme Court precedent, should have con-
cluded that CSR had the minimum contacts with Minnesota necessary to
make jurisdiction constitutional.
B. Fair Play and SubstantialJustice
In addition to the requirement of minimum contacts, courts must
examine those contacts to ensure that the assertion of jurisdiction would
. . ... f . 44not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In
determining what 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
are, most courts use another test, 4 5 which is separate and apart from the
minimum contacts five-part test. Instead of utilizing this test, however, the
In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation Court erroneously focused on whether or
not CSR could foresee being haled into court in Minnesota. 44 While fore-
seeabiltiy is an important determination, the court clearly came to the
wrong conclusion. If CSR could foresee that its products would reach
Minnesota, then CSR must have expected consumers to purchase its
products. And if CSR expected Minnesota consumers to purchase its
product, then CSR could foresee a potential lawsuit in Minnesota.1
47
141. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d at 902.
142. The fifth factor asks the court to evaluate the convenience to the party or
parties over whom jurisdiction is to be granted. See Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 720.
143. Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
(noting the burden on a foreign defendant should have significant weight in as-
sessing the reasonableness of stretching personal jurisdiction over national
boundaries).
144. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
145. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980):
[T]he forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the
forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Id. (citation omitted). See generally Hornbeck, supra note 32, at 1406-07
(discussing that the due process analysis should always be a "primary concern").
146. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Minn. 1996).
"The foreseeability required is one which demonstrates 'that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
147. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 540 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995); cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117
(1987) (Justice Brennan, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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V. SUGGESTED APPROACH
As the above analysis shows, had the Minnesota Supreme Court fol-
lowed prior precedent it would have found sufficient contacts to allow the
assertion ofjurisdiction over CSR. However, the court focused on the fact
that no direct contacts existed, which suggests only one conclusion: The
court was looking for something more than what was needed prior to this
case. This something more-which is the hallmark of the stream of com-
merce plus approach used by the Eighth Circuit and used by Justice
O'Connor in Asahi-conflicts with the approach used in prior Minnesota
decisions.
In In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court
broadsided the legal community, as well as Minnesota consumers, with its
denial of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant. 148 Although the court
seems to be headed in a new direction regarding the application of the
stream of commerce theory in Minnesota, nowhere in the opinion did the
court acknowledge this. As a result, the court has left the bench and bar
confused' 49 and has left future Minnesota plaintiffs with asbestosis as a re-
sult of CSR's products uncompensated for their injuries. What is needed
to rectify the confusion is a reasoned and clear explanation by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court regarding what, if any, stream of commerce approach
Minnesota follows.1 50
A well-reasoned opinion or a clear majority opinion from the United
States Supreme Court on the stream of commerce issue would, of course,
also alleviate the problem. Jurisdictional law in this country is in disarray
as a result of the "minimum contacts" and "traditions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice" criteria, originally announced in International Shoe.' The
Supreme Court's failure to adequately define these standards has resulted
in multiple theories as to what are the applicable limits of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is particularly true in
stream of commerce cases where there exists at least two and arguably
three separate approaches. Minnesota is just one example of this.
148. See In re Minnesota Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d at 248. Even more per-
plexing than the courts apparent change in direction, is the fact that the court
was not even required to reach the jurisdictional issue to find in favor of CSR. See
id. at 245-46. The court also ruled that a large portion of the proof offered by the
plaintiffs was inadmissible. See id. As a result, the court could have disposed of
the case without addressing the jurisdictional issue. See id. at 247 n.3.
149. See, e.g., State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL
557670, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997). In a well reasoned opinion, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction over an Internet advertiser fol-
lowing the stream of commerce approach as it stood prior to In re Minnesota Asbes-
tos Litigation. Id.
150. See id.
151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Of course, these problems stem, at least in part, from the societal
changes that this country has experienced over the last fifty years. Cur-
rently, we live in a world where commerce is conducted on an interna-
tional scale. When developing the current jurisdictional factors, the Court
could not have imagined the problems that modem society faces as a re-
sults of the global market. Consequently, the outdated standards promul-
gated by the Court require a complete overhaul. The Court again, as in
Pennoyer and International Shoe, needs to take an active role and redefine• . • 153
the standards that determine when a civil action may be brought. In the
process, the court should examine the mistakes of the past and take a
more pragmatic view as to what due process requires. Armed with this
pragmatic view, the court can then promulgate new standards that practi-
tioners can apply without the uncertainty that currently runs amok in ju-
risdictional law. Additionally, these factors must reflect and anticipate the
problems that American society now faces in the global market and the
world economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the amorphous nature of Supreme Court personal ju-
risdiction law, Minnesota, like other jurisdictions, has developed multiple
approaches for dealing with personal jurisdiction questions. Nowhere is
this more true than when a defendant has placed a product into the
stream of commerce. To date there are two, and arguably three, ap-
proaches to the stream of commerce problem. After the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's decision in In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, Minnesota ap-
pears to follow at least two of these stream of commerce approaches.
What Minnesota needs is a well reasoned clear explanation of what, if any,
approach is being followed in the state. Only then will it be possible for
153. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Stretching the Long-Arm in Asahi Metal Indus-
try Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court: Worldwide Jurisdiction after World-Wide Volkswagen?, 4
B.U. INT'L LJ. 327, 349 (1986) (suggesting that the same result could be accom-
plished through Congressional action to regulation the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign component parts manufacturers); Luther L. McDougall III, Judicial
Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 59 (1982)
(stating that "[o]nly by abandoning these already obsolete doctrines can the
Court hope to achieve more appropriate results"); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't
Know Its Asahi From Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 875, 876 (1990) (advocating that
the law of personal jurisdiction be made more predictable and easier to apply);
Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 849, 852-53 (1989) (advocating that a theory of political consent
should serve as the basis for jurisdictional standards rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts; Time for a Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485, 527-28 (1984) (advocating
new jurisdictional standards which would focus on fairness to the defendant
rather than "minimum contacts").
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practitioners, plaintiffs, defendants, and courts to answer what should be a
simple question: When can a civil action be brought in Minnesota?
Scott M. Hagel
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